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Abstract
In electronic business environment, it is critical for
an enterprise to assess information systems security
(ISS) risks. In this paper, we propose a hybrid
approach for ISS risk assessment in e-business.
Given there is a great deal of uncertainty in the ISS
risk assessment in e-business environment, in the
hybrid approach, we combine the evidence theory
with fuzzy sets to deal with the uncertain evidence
found in the ISS risk assessment. The proposed
approach provides a new way to define the basic
belief assignment in fuzzy measure. Moreover, the
approach also provides a method of testing the
evidential consistency, which can reduce the
uncertainty derived from the conflicts of evidence.
Finally, the approach is further demonstrated and
validated via a case study, in which sensitivity
analysis is employed to validate the reliability of
the proposed approach.

1. Introduction
In electronic business, the dependence on
information systems (IS) has increased in current
business environments where a variety of
transactions involving trading of goods and
services are accomplished electronically [1, 2].
Increasing organizational dependence on the IS in
e-business has led to a corresponding increase in
the impact of information systems security (ISS)
abuses. Therefore, the ISS is a critical issue that has
attracted much attention from both researchers and
practitioners in e-business.
In order to prevent security breaches, businesses
use controls (and various countermeasures) to
safeguard their assets from various patterns of
threats by identifying the IS assets that are
vulnerable to threats. But, even in the presence of
controls, the assets are often not fully protected
from threats because of inherent control
weaknesses. Thus, the risk assessment is a critical
step for the ISS risk management in e-business [3].
In practice, the ISS risk assessment is quite
complex and full of the uncertainty as well [4]. The
uncertainty, existing in the risk assessment in
e-business, has been the primary factor that
influences the effectiveness of the ISS risk
assessment to a large extent. Therefore, in order to

deal with the incompleteness and vagueness of
information, the uncertainty must be taken into
account in the ISS risk assessment. However, most
existing approaches applied to the ISS risk
assessment have some drawbacks on handling
uncertainty in the process of assessment.
To address these aforementioned issues in
e-business, we propose a hybrid approach that
combines the evidence theory with fuzzy sets for
ISS risk assessment in electronic business. In this
paper, the approach provides a new way to define
the basic belief assignment in fuzzy measure for
dealing with the uncertain evidence found in the
ISS risk assessment in e-business. Moreover, we
discuss a process of testing the evidential
consistency in the ISS risk assessment in e-business.
This process can effectively reduce the uncertainty
derived from the conflicts of evidence provided by
experts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 reviews the related works on ISS risk
assessment in e-business. In the next section, we
discuss the procedure of the hybrid approach for
ISS risk assessment in detail in Section 3. Then, the
proposed approach is further demonstrated and
validated in Section 4 via a case study. Finally, we
summarize our contributions and present our
further research.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Related Work
The existing approaches for the ISS risk assessment
in e-business can be grouped into three major
categories: the quantitative approaches, the
qualitative approaches, and the combination of
quantitative and qualitative approaches.
The quantitative approaches consider the IS risk
exposure as a function of the probability of a threat
and the expected loss due to the vulnerability of the
organization to this threat [5, 6]. The stochastic
dominance (SD) approach [7] focuses on
answering the specific question of what
contingency plan should be used to prevent losses
if a disaster occurs. To achieve this goal, the SD
compares the costs associated with various backup
and recovery options during the entire disaster
recovery process in all areas of the organization.
However, it fails to provide guidance on how to
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assess the failure of multiple controls pertaining to
a single threat or how to assess the failure and the
impact of a single control on multiple threats. The
proposed approach in this paper provides a
structure to the ISS risk assessment process by
decomposing risk into its subcomponents and
identifying
relevant
controls
and
their
interrelationships. The approach based on neural
networks [8] consists of five phases: network
parameter initialization, input the training sample
and the expectation output, network self-learning,
forward propagation, and back propagation. If the
error function value is smaller than the
pre-established value, the network learning is
stopped, otherwise turn to the second phase. While
this approach has the intelligent features such as
the self-learning and the acquisition of knowledge,
which is different from the conventional methods,
it is very difficult to get a large numbers of training
samples for network self-learning in the process of
the risk assessment in e-business. The modular
attack trees [9] approach is specified as parametric
constraints, which allow quantifying the probability
of security breaches that occur due to internal
component vulnerabilities as well as vulnerabilities
in the component’s deployment environment.
Based on the attack probabilities and the structure
of the modular attack trees, security risks can be
estimated for the information system. But, this
approach has the difficulties capturing the
uncertainty in the ISS risk environment dealing
with the existence of the incompleteness and
vagueness of information.
In the qualitative approaches, such as the logic
analysis [10] and the Delphi method [11], the
probability data is not required and only the
estimated potential loss is used. Since the
qualitative analysis depends to a great extent on the
analyst’s experience, both the process and the
result of the security risk assessment are relatively
subjective [12].
As information systems have become more
complex in e-business, neither quantitative nor
qualitative approaches can properly model the
assessment process alone. Therefore, the
comprehensive approaches combining both the
quantitative and the qualitative approaches are
needed [13, 14]. The approach using the Bayesian
Networks (BNs) [15, 16, 17] provides an objective
and visible support for risk analysis. It consists of
three phases: the BN initialization (define the
structure and the set of conditional probability
distributions), the risk monitoring, and the risk
analysis. Using new evidence obtained from
information system, this approach can continually
estimate risk probability and identify the sources of
risk. The approach based on the fuzzy
comprehensive evaluation (FCE) [18, 19, 20] is a
mathematical method to comprehensively evaluate
the ISS risks by using fuzzy set theory of fuzzy

mathematics. Although this approach is good at
processing the ambiguous information by
simulating the characteristic of human in making
the judgment, it is not capable to provide the
graphical relationships among various ISS risk
factors using flow charts or diagrams. The
proposed approach in this paper consists of the
graphical representation of relevant constructs
through an evidential diagram, which can fully
capture the complexity of multiple controls dealing
with one threat and also that of one control dealing
with multiple threats. In addition, both the above
approaches are suffering from the uncertainty
derived from the conflicts of evidence provided by
experts. In this paper, we propose a method of
testing the evidential consistency, which can reduce
the uncertainty derived from the conflicts of
evidence.
In this paper, we combine the evidence theory with
fuzzy sets to model the uncertainty involved in the
ISS risk assessment in e-business. In addition to
representing uncertainties, the present approach
allows the decision maker to develop an evidential
diagram to assess the ISS risk that contains various
variables such as the IS assets, the related threats,
and the corresponding countermeasures in
e-business. Next, the decision maker can input his
or her judgments about the presence or absence of
threats and the impact of countermeasures on the
corresponding threats according to belief functions.
2.2 Evidence Theory
The
evidence
theory,
also
called
the
Dempster-Shafer’s theory, has often been applied
in the reasoning under uncertainty [21, 22].
Suppose we have a decision problem with n
possible elements or states of nature forming a
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive set.
This set is called the frame of discernment
represented by Θ. The power set of Θ containing
all the possible subsets of Θ, represented as P(Θ).
A basic belief assignment (BBA) is a function from
P(Θ) to [0, 1] defined by:
m : P (Θ ) → [0,1]
,
(1)
A m ( A)
where A is an element of P(Θ). In addition, it
satisfies the following conditions:
(2)
∑ m ( A) = 1 ,
A∈P (Θ )

m ( ∅ ) =0.
(3)
Basically, the BBA pertaining to a statement
measures the degree of belief directly assigned to
the statement based on the evidence.
Dempster’s rule is the fundamental rule for
combining two or more items of evidence in the
belief function framework. For simplicity, let us
illustrate Dempster’s rule for only two items of
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evidence. In general, if m1 and m2 are two BBAs
representing two independent items of evidence
pertaining to Θ, then the combined BBAs for a
subset A of frame Θ using Dempster’s rule is given
by
m ( A) = K −1 ∑ m1 ( B ) m2 ( C ) ,
(4)

3. The Hybrid Approach for ISS Risk
Assessment
The hybrid approach consists of four phases: (a)
establish the ISS index system and quantify the
index weights, (b) construct the evidential diagram,
(c) compute the BBAs for the assertions in the
evidential diagram, (d) test the evidential
consistency. Each phase is discussed in detail as
follows. And, the procedure of the approach is
given in Figure 1.

B ∩C = A

where

K = 1−

∑

B ∩C =∅

m1 ( B ) m2 ( C )

,

which

represents the renormalization constant.
second term in K represents the conflict.

The

Establish ISS index system and quantify index weights

Construct the evidential diagram

Compute the BBAs for subassertions and main assertion

Compute the similarity matrix
Is the similarity of any
two items of evidence
greater than or equal to
the threshold?

No

Compute the credibility
of the items of evidence

Yes
Combination of evidence

Compute weighted
average for the BBAs

Figure 1. The hybrid approach procedure.
3.1 Establish the ISS Index System and Quantify
Index Weights

The ISS index system is based on the risk analysis,
which includes the identification of vulnerabilities
and threats, the analysis of the losses arising from
the threats acting on vulnerabilities [23]. Based on
the ISS risk analysis for an on-line securities
company (see Section 4)，we have established the
index system (see Table 1).
For quantifying the index weights, six information
system experts, two of which are also this
company’s IT managers, were invited to fill in the
questionnaires about the comparison table of factor
weights. And then, we have quantified the index
weights using the method in reference [24]. This
method can effectively reduce the uncertainty in
the process of quantifying index weights [24].
3.2 Construct the Evidential Diagram

An evidential diagram consists of assertions,
evidence, and their interrelationships. Assertions
include the main assertion and subassertions. The

Table 1. ISS risk index system and index weights.
First
level
index

Second level
indexes

ISS
vulnerabilities

ISS threat

Weights

0.262

0.246

ISS
risk

Assets loss

Capability loss

Cost of system
recovery

0.206

0.173

0.113

Third level indexes

Weights

Hardware defects

0.134

Software defects
Network
vulnerabilities
Communication
protocol
vulnerabilities
Deletion or loss of
information
Breach of network
resources
Information abuse
Information
leakage

0.369

Tangible assets loss

0.512

0.284
0.213
0.264
0.303
0.229
0.204

Intangible
assets
loss
Service
interruption
Service delay

0.184

Service weakening

0.135

Cost of information
recovery
Cost of service
recovery

0.488
0.681

0.338
0.662
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main assertion is the highest-level assertion; the
subassertions
are
lower-level
assertions.
Relationships between assertions (e.g., between the
main assertion and subassertions, and between
higher-level
subassertions
and
lower-level
subassertions) need to be defined using logical
relationships such as “and” and “or.” And evidence
represents the information that supports or negates
assertions.
In this paper, the evidential diagram is derived
from the ISS index system. Suppose a manager is
interested in evaluating the ISS risk involved in the
ISS vulnerabilities. The corresponding evidential
diagram is given in Figure 2, which is a part of the
evidential diagram for the main assertion “ISS risk”
in a securities company. In Figure 2, the rounded
boxes represent assertion nodes. And evidence
nodes are represented by rectangular boxes in the
evidential diagrams. Numbers in parentheses
represent weights. Evidence nodes are connected to
the corresponding assertion(s) that they directly
pertain to. For instance, the evidence “E1.1.1
Vulnerabilities of hardware protection measures”
directly pertains to assertion “A1.1 ISS
vulnerabilities” and thus it is connected to that
assertion.

composed of fuzzy subsets of E, then F(E) is called
the fuzzy power set of E.
Definition 2. Let F1、F2 ∈ F ( E ) . Then uF1 ∪ F2 and
uF1 ∩ F2 are defined as:

(1) uF1 ∪ F2 ( e )

uF1 ( e ) ∨ uF2 ( e ) ;

(2) uF1 ∩ F2 ( e )

uF1 ( e ) ∧ uF2 ( e ) .

Definition 3. If the following conditions hold:
(1) E ∈ F ( E ) ;

(2) If F1、F2、 、Fn ∈ F ( E ) , then

n

∪ F ∈ F (E) ,
i

i =1

then F(E) is called a fuzzy additive set.
Definition 4. Let P(ei) be a probability density
function on E, F(E) a fuzzy additive set on E, and
wi a weight of ei. If F ∈ F ( E ) , then the

( )

probability P F

( )

can be defined as:

n

P F = ∑ uF ( ei ) wi P ( ei ) i = 1, 2,

,n

(5)

i =1

Definition 5. Set up a mapping Γ : F ( E ) → Θ . Let

of
P(Θ).
If
m
(j = 1, 2, ... , 2 ; k =

Aj
be
an
element
∃Fk ∈ F ( E ) , s.t. Γ Fk = Aj

( )

1, 2, … , l), then the mapping Γ [ P ] : Θ → [ 0,1] is
E1.1.1 Vulnerabilities of hardware
protection measures (0.134)
E1.1.2 Software security Hidden
danger (0.369)
A1.1 ISS vulnerabilities
(0.262)

E1.1.3 Vulnerabilities of network
security protection measures (0.284)
E1.1.4 Communication protocol
vulnerabilities (0.213)

Figure 2. Hypothetical evidential diagram for ISS
vulnerabilities.

3.3 Compute the BBAs for Assertions in
Evidential Diagram

In e-business, the evidence is generally described
in fuzzy form in ISS risk assessment [25]. For this
reason, we introduce fuzzy sets to evidence space
and define the BBAs in fuzzy measure so that we
can further reduce the degree of uncertainty in ISS
risk assessment.
In this section, we combine evidence theory with
fuzzy sets to compute the BBAs in fuzzy form as
follow.
We assume that E is an evidence space, E = {e1,
e2,…, en}, and Θ = {a1, a2,…, am}.
Definition 1. Let F be a fuzzy set on E,
uF : E → [ 0,1] , e → uF (e) . Then uF is called
membership function for F , and uF (e) is called

a membership from e to F . Let F(E) be a set

defined as:
⎧ ⎛
⎞
⎪ ⎜
⎟
⎪ P ⎜ ∪ Fk ⎟
⎪
Γ [ P ] ( Aj ) = ⎨ ⎜ ΓFk(∈FFk )(=EA) j ⎟
,
⎝
⎠ A ≠∅
⎪
j
M
⎪
⎪0
Aj = ∅
⎩
⎛
⎞
⎜
⎟
M = ∑ P ⎜ ∪ Fk ⎟
A j ∈P (Θ )
⎜ Fk ∈F ( E )
⎟
A j ≠∅
⎝ Γ ( Fk ) = A j ⎠

where

(6)

.

Let

⎛
⎞
⎜
⎟
B = ⎜ ∪ Fk ⎟ , we have:
⎜ Fk ∈F ( E )
⎟
⎝ Γ ( Fk ) = A j ⎠

M =

n

∑Θ ∑ u ( e ) w P ( e )

A j ∈P (
A j ≠∅

=

)

i =1
n

∑ ∑

B

i

i

{

i

}

max uFk ( ei ) wi P ( ei )
( )

A j ∈P (Θ ) i =1 Γ Fk = A j
A j ≠∅

.

(7)

Based on above definitions, we can propose the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. Γ [ P ] ( Aj ) is a BBA on Θ.
Proof:
If Aj = ∅ , then Γ [ P ] ( ∅ ) = 0 ;

If Aj ≠ ∅ , we have:
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⎛
⎞
⎜
⎟
P ⎜ ∪ Fk ⎟
⎜ Fk ∈F ( E) ⎟
Γ ( Fk ) = Aj
⎠
Γ [ P] ( Aj ) = ∑ ⎝
∑
M
Aj ∈P(Θ )
Aj ∈P(Θ )

|| m ||2 = 〈 m, m〉 .
(11)
Based on the evidential distance, we can further
define the similarity of two BBAs:
S ( mi , m j ) = 1 − d BPA ( mi , m j ) i, j = 1, 2, , n . (12)

.

⎛
⎞
⎜
⎟
1
P ⎜ ∪ Fk ⎟ = 1
=
∑
M Aj ∈P(Θ ) ⎜ Fk ∈F ( E) ⎟
⎝ Γ ( Fk ) = Aj ⎠
The proposition is proved.
According to above definitions and Proposition 1,
the mass function, i.e. Γ [ P ] ( Aj ) , can effectively

meet the requirement to deal with the situation
where there is the uncertain evidence in the process
of ISS risk assessment in e-business.
3.4 Test the Evidential Consistency

In the uncertain reasoning by evidence theory, if an
item of evidence is in conflict with other(s), the
reasoning result would not be sound [26]. To
illustrate the conflict of evidences, we give an
example as follow.
Assumed that the frame Θ is {a, b, c}. If the BBAs
for an item of evidence A are m1(a) = 0.99 and m1(b)
= 0.01, and the BBAs for an item of evidence B are
m2(b) = 0.01 and m2(c) = 0.99, then we have m(a) =
m(c) = 0 and m(b) = 1 by combining of evidences.
Although the supports of A and B for event b is
very low, the reasoning result is that the event b is
true. It is obviously not reasonable. Therefore, the
testing evidential consistency has important
significance for the ISS risk assessment based on
evidence theory.
Furthermore, we discuss the process of testing
evidential consistency in detail next.
Definition 6. Let S P(Θ ) be the space generated by
all the subsets of Θ. A BBA is a vector m of
S P(Θ ) with coordinates m ( Ai ) such that
2N

∑ m ( Ai ) = 1 and m ( Ai ) ≥ 0, i = 1,…, 2 N ,

(8)

i =1

where Ai ∈ P (Θ ) .
Assume that m1 and m2 are two BBAs on the same
frame of discernment Θ. According to reference
[22], the distance between m1 and m2 is:
1
d BPA ( m1 , m2 ) =
(|| m1 ||2 + || m2 ||2 −2〈m1 , m2 〉 ) (9)
2
where 〈 m1 , m2 〉 is the scalar product defined by
2N

2N

〈 m1 , m2 〉 = ∑∑ m1 ( Ai ) m2 ( Aj )
i =1 j =1

| Ai ∩ Aj |
| Ai ∪ Aj |

,

(10)

with Ai , Aj ∈ P(Θ) for i, j = 1,…, 2N. || m ||2 is then
the square norm of m :

Thus the result can be represented by a similarity
matrix:
S1 j
S1n ⎤
⎡ 1 S12
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
Sij
Sin ⎥ .
SM = ⎢ Si1 Si 2
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎢ Sn1 S n 2
⎥
1
S
nj
⎣
⎦
Furthermore, the support for a BBA mi is:
n

Sup ( mi ) = ∑ S ( mi , m j ) i, j = 1, 2,

,n .

(13)

j =1
j ≠i

The support for the BBA mi, i.e. Sup(mi), reflects
the degree of the support of other BBAs. Based on
it, we have the credibility C(mi):
Sup ( mi )
C ( mi ) = n
i, j = 1, 2, , n .
(14)
Sup
m
(
)
∑
i
i =1

n

Obviously,

∑C (m ) = 1 .
i =1

i

Therefore, C(mi) can

represent the weight of the BBA mi.
In the process of testing evidential consistency in
the ISS risk assessment, a threshold value ξ can
be set according to the actual situations. If the
similarity of any two items of evidence is greater
than or equal to the threshold value ξ , then it is
considered that the existing items of evidence are
consistent. In contrast, if the similarity is lesser
than ξ , we have to adjust the existing items of
evidence.
For the evidential adjustment, if an item of
evidence is supported by other items of evidence,
then it has a higher credibility and we assign a
larger weight for it in evidence combination; In
contrast, if an item of evidence is in conflict with
other items of evidence, then its credibility and
weight should be smaller. The steps of the
evidential adjustment are as follows:
Step 1. Obtain the credibility of the items of
evidence.
Based on Eqs. (13) and (14), we can obtain the
credibility of the items of evidence.
Step 2. Weighted average for BBAs of the items of
evidence
Let us treat the credibility as the weight of evidence.
Then, we weighted average for BBAs of the items
of evidence.
Step 3. Combine the weighted average evidence.
According to reference [27], if there are n items of
evidence, we combine the weighted average
evidence n-1 times using Eq. (4).
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4. Case Analysis and Evaluation
In order to further validate the proposed approach,
we used it in assessing an actual company’s
information systems. This company is a Chinese
financial services firm providing on-line services in
securities trading and sales.
In this section, we first demonstrate the presented
approach via a case study according to the
procedure of Section 3. Then sensitivity analysis is
employed to validate the reliability of the proposed
approach. Finally, the effectiveness of the approach
is evaluated by comparing the results of the
proposed model in this paper, the fuzzy
comprehensive evaluation (FCE), the Bayesian
Networks (BNs), and evidence theory.

4.1 Case Analysis

We invited six information system experts, two of
which are also IT managers of the company, to
assess the security risk of the company's
information systems. As mentioned in Section 3.1,
the ISS index system and weights have been
established based on the risk analysis for this
securities company (see Table 1).
Furthermore, based upon the ISS index system, an
evidential diagram (see Figure 3) for the main
assertion “ISS risk” was developed. In Figure 3, we
used the “and” relationship between the main
assertion and the subassertions, which implies that
the main assertion is true if and only if all
subassertions are true.

E1.1.1 Vulnerabilities of hardware
protection measures (0.134)

A1.1 ISS
Vulnerabilities
(0.262)

E1.1.2 Software security Hidden
danger (0.369)
E1.1.3 Vulnerabilities of network
security protection measures (0.284)
E1.1.4 Communication protocol
vulnerabilities (0.213)
E1.2.1 Deletion or loss of information
due to misoperation (0.264)

A1. ISS
risk

&

A1.2 Threat
(0.246)

E1.2.2 Breach of network resources
due to network attacks (0.303)
E1.2.3 Information abuse (0.229)
E1.2.4 Information leakage (0.204)

A1.3 Assets loss
(0.206)

E1.3.1 Tangible assets loss (0.512)
E1.3.2 Intangible assets loss (0.488)
E1.4.1 Service interruption (0.681)

A1.4 Capability loss
(0.173)

E1.4.2 Service delay (0.184)
E1.4.3 Service weakening (0.135)

A1.5 Cost of system
recovery (0.113)

E1.5.1 Cost of information recovery
(0.338)
E1.5.2 Cost of service recovery
(0.662)

Figure 3. Evidential diagram for the main assertion “ISS risk”.
According to the evidential diagram, we defined
the frame of discernment of the assertions as Θ =
{very high risk, high risk, median risk, low risk,
very low risk}, where A1={very high risk},
A2={high risk}, A3={median risk}, A4={low risk},
and A5={very low risk}. With the exception of A1 to
A5, other subsets of P(Θ), noted by U, represent the
unknown degree of evidence.
Six experts assessed the strength of evidence,
which indicate the level of support that an item of

evidence provides. For simplicity, we illustrated
the process of reasoning by the strength of an item
of evidence provided by one expert.
Strength of evidence is represented by fuzzy form.
In this case study, we employed asymmetric
triangular membership function [28] to describe the
belief degree of evidence. As shown in Figure 4,
the membership values of the evidence E, E = {e1,
e2,…, e15}, are provided by an expert. F1 to F5
are defined as the fuzzy subsets on E and the level
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of risk of Fk is higher than Fk −1 . Then, based on
Proposition 1, the BBAs for subassertions A1.1 to
A1.5 were computed (see Table 2).
uF ( e )

F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

1

Then, we tested the consistency of above six items
of evidence from m1 to m6 as mentioned in Section
3.4. Since there were only six experts participating
in the risk assessment, we set a higher threshold ξ ,
ξ = 0.85. According to Table 3 and Eqs. (9) to (12),
we obtained the similarity matrix:
⎡ 1
⎢ 0.816
⎢
⎢ 0.801
SM = ⎢
⎢ 0.754
⎢ 0.832
⎢
⎣⎢0.817

0

e3 e1 e6 e10 e7 e8 e2 e11e14 e9 e5 e15 e12 e4 e13
E

Figure 4. Membership function.
Table 2. The BBAs for the subassertions.
m ( A3 )

m ( A4 )

m ( A5 )

m (U )

0.216

0.203

0.215

0.172

0.077

0.177

0.130

0.345

0.208

0.047

0.069

0.131

0.169

0.251

0.257

0.123

0.132

0.147

0.206

0.331

0.149

0.035

0.070

0.131

0.133

0.298

0.332

0.036

Subassertion

m ( A1 )

m ( A2 )

A1.1

0.107

A1.2

0.093

A1.3
A1.4
A1.5

The BBAs for main assertion “ISS risk” are
computed by combining the BBAs of the
subassertions based on the structure of Figure 3.
This is done by propagating the BBAs through the
network. Shenoy and Shafer [29] discussed this
process in detail. The process of propagating BBAs
in a network becomes computationally quite
complex. However, there are several software
packages available [30, 31] that facilitate the
process. We use the tool for propagating
uncertainty in valuation networks [30] to conduct
the computation. The BBAs for main assertion
“ISS risk” are m(A1) = 0.049, m(A2) = 0.162, m(A3)
= 0.214, m(A4) = 0.316, m(A5) = 0.217, and m(U) =
0.042.
Similarly, we could also obtain the BBAs
according to the strength of evidence provided by
other five experts (see Table 3).

0.816 0.801 0.754 0.832 0.817 ⎤
1
0.853 0.844 0.781 0.776 ⎥⎥
0.853
1
0.696 0.798 0.800 ⎥
⎥.
0.844 0.696
1
0.821 0.755 ⎥
0.781 0.798 0.821
1
0.829 ⎥
⎥
0.776 0.800 0.755 0.829
1 ⎦⎥

It is obvious that the similarity of any two items of
evidence is lesser than ξ . Therefore, we have to
adjust the existing items of evidence. The results of
adjustment are as follows:
(1) Based on Eqs. (13) and (14), the credibility of
the items of evidence are:
C(m1) = 0.243, C(m2) = 0.216, C(m3) = 0.109, C(m4)
= 0.045, C(m5) = 0.186, and C(m6) = 0.201.
(2) Weighted average for BBAs of the items of
evidence:
mMAE(A1) = 0.058, mMAE(A2) = 0.143, mMAE(A3) =
0.214, mMAE(A4) = 0.311, mMAE(A5) = 0.210, and
mMAE(U) = 0.064.
(3) Combine the weighted average evidence five
times:
m(A1) = 0.032, m(A2) = 0.138, m(A3) = 0.223, m(A4)
= 0.416, m(A5) = 0.165, and m(U) = 0.026.
Consequently, the results of ISS risk assessment in
this case study is shown in Figure 5, in which the
belief supporting A4, i.e. “ISS risk is low”, is 0.416.
This suggests that we have the most confidence
that the ISS risk is low.
0.45
0.416

0.4
0.35
0.3
m 0.25
0.223

0.2
0.15

0.165

0.138

0.1
0.05
0

0.032
A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

0.026
U

Figure 5. Results of the ISS risk assessment.

Table 3. The BBAs for main assertion “ISS risk”.
Experts

m ( A1 )

m ( A2 )

m ( A3 )

m ( A4 )

m ( A5 )

m (U )

Expert1(m1)

0.049

0.162

0.214

0.316

0.217

0.042

Expert2(m2)

0.039

0.169

0.220

0.323

0.198

0.051

Expert3(m3)

0.098

0.104

0.199

0.248

0.254

0.097

Expert4(m4)

0.102

0.153

0.296

0.207

0.186

0.056

Expert5(m5)

0.065

0.112

0.186

0.298

0.203

0.136

Expert6(m6)

0.053

0.142

0.221

0.300

0.204

0.080

4.2 Sensitivity Analysis

In this section, we perform sensitivity analysis to
investigate how the change of the strength of
evidence affects the result of the ISS risk
assessment.
For instance, we decreased the strengths of E1.4.3
and E1.4.1 (see in Figure 3), and then examined the
impact of the change of the strength on the beliefs
of the main assertion “A1. ISS risk” respectively.
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The corresponding results are shown in Figure 6
and Figure 7.
The results in Figure 6 and Figure 7 indicate that
although the strengths of E1.4.3 and E1.4.1 have
been changed, the belief supporting A4 is still lager
than others. Furthermore, by comparing Figure 6
with Figure 7, we can also observe that the larger
the weight of evidence, the larger the impact on the
belief of the main assertion is, as shown in Figure 3
where the weights of E1.4.3 and E1.4.1 are 0.135
and 0.681 respectively.

FCE, BNs, and evidence theory respectively.
Firstly, we compared the Method1 with the
Method2 and the Method3 (see Figure 8).
Belief
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2

0.45

0.15

Before change
After change

0.4

0.1

0.35

0.05

0.3
m

Method1
Method2
Method3

0
Very high

0.25
0.2

High

Risk level

0.15
0.1

Figure 8. Comparison of the Methodl, the Method2,
and the Method3.

0.05
0

A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

U

The assessment results indicated that the sequences
of risk level obtained from three methods are
consistent. Furthermore, we can also observe that
the degree of the belief of low risk level is higher in
the Method1 than in the Method2 and the Method3,
while the degrees of the belief of other levels are
lower in the Method1 than in the Method2 and the
Method3. Therefore, the Method1 is more effective
than the other two methods in the ISS risk
assessment in e-business.
Secondly, we compared the Method1 with the
Method4 (see Figure 9).

Figure 6. Impact of the change of E1.4.3 strength
on the main assertion.
0.45
Before change
After change

0.4
0.35
0.3
m

Very low

Low

Median

0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1

0.45

0.05

0.4

0

A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

Method1
Method4

0.35

U

0.3

Figure 7. Impact of the change of E1.4.1 strength
on the main assertion.
In addition, we have also performed sensitivity
analysis to investigate how the strengths of other
items of evidence affected the beliefs on the main
assertions. The results showed that the small
variations in the input strengths of evidence do not
impact significantly the beliefs of the main
assertion. This implies that the approach is robust
and reliable to small amounts of measurement error
in assessing strength of evidence.
4.3 Evaluation of the Hybrid Approach

Under the same conditions, we have employed the
FCE, the BNs, and evidence theory to assess the
ISS risk in this case study.
In particular, we use Method1, Method2, Method3,
and Method4 to refer to our proposed approach,

m

0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0

A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

Figure 9. Comparison of the Method1 and the
Method4.
The experiment results show that our proposed
approach combining evidence theory with fuzzy
sets outperforms evidence theory method in the ISS
risk assessment in e-business. Moreover, in Figure
9, we can also find that the m value of U in the
Method1 is higher than that in the Method4. Thus,
in the ISS risk assessment, there is lower
uncertainty in the Method1 than in the Method4.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a hybrid approach that
combines the evidence theory with fuzzy sets for
ISS risk assessment in electronic business. This
approach has several advantages. First, the
approach is based on evidence theory and fuzzy
sets, which can effectively model the uncertainty
involved in the assessment process in e-business.
Second, for dealing with fuzzy evidence found in
the ISS risk assessment, this approach provides a
new way to define the basic belief assignment in
fuzzy measure. Further, this approach also provides
a method of testing the evidential consistency,
which can reduce the uncertainty derived from the
conflicts of evidence provided by experts.
In this paper, we also employed the sensitivity
analysis to validate the reliability of the proposed
approach. In addition, the effectiveness of the
approach is evaluated by comparing the results of
risk assessment of the proposed approach in this
paper, FCE, BNs, and evidence theory.
Although the proposed approach performs with an
advantage over existing methods in e-business
environment, it still requires domain experts’ belief
inputs at the individual evidence level. Future
research will be conducted to explore how to better
elicit practitioners’ assessments of the strength of
the evidence.
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